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STANDARDIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AN
ACTOR-NETWORK PERSPECTIVE
Gao, Ping, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM), University of
Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9QH, UK

Abstract
Present information systems studies focus on technology from developed countries. Little is known
about the standardization of indigenous technology in the developing world. Drawing upon actornetwork theory, this paper investigates China’s experience of developing and deploying wireless
local-area network (WLAN) standards. We demonstrate that counter-network is a useful concept to
analyze the mechanism of actor-network formulation. We argue that developing countries should set
up a R&D management system that supports the principle of tech-neutralism
Keywords: Actor-network theory, China, Developing countries, Standards, Standardization, WLAN
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1

INTRODUCTION

Technology standardization is the critical research frontier for information Systems (King and
Lyytinen, 2004). But existing literature focuses primarily on technology from developed countries
(Walsham, 2001), and little is known about the development and implementation of indigenous
technology in the developing world. This paper contributes to the literature by investigating China’s
experience of developing and deploying wireless local-area network (WLAN) standards.
The principal WLAN standards in use are the IEEE 802.11 series, so called Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity).
Because a wireless network broadcasts messages using radio, it is particularly susceptible to
eavesdropping. Hence, security is a challenge in the standardization of WLAN products. The security
flaw has been a major concern for users, especially business users, to adopt the Wi-Fi technology.
Though IEEE has been making efforts to improve it, the progress is slower than that the market
requires. Consequently, China has developed its own security scheme for WLAN called WAPI
(WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure). While the technological advantage of WAPI has
not been seriously challenged, its implementation method has received strong objections. As a result,
WAPI has failed to be implemented.
The analysis of China’s experience of standardizing WLAN products is important from both
theoretical and practical perspectives. In contrast to current standard studies that treat standard
development and implementation separately (Gerst et al, 2005), this paper analyzes China’s attempt to
standardize indigenous WLAN technology in an integrated approach. We will identify what factors
have shaped the process of WAPI development and implementation, and how.
Our paper has theoretical as well as practical contributions. Our case study demonstrates actornetwork theory, especially its concept of counter-network, enables us to better understand the
standardization process compared to the nationalism perspective currently being used (Braa et al,
2004; Suttmeier, 2005).
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RESEARCH APPROACH

2.1

Theoretical ground

We aim to disclose the social interaction around the WAPI technology. The actor-network theory suits
our initiative and hence we employ it as an analytical tool. One potential application of this theory is
the investigation of the process whereby the respective interests of different human and non-human
elements are aligned into a social and technological arrangement or artefact - in our case the WAPI
standards and their implementation method (Walsham and Sahay, 1999).
“Successful networks of aligned interests are created through the enrolment of a sufficient body of
allies and the translation of their interests so that they are willing to participate in particular ways of
thinking and acting that maintain the network” (Walsham and Sahay, 1999 , p.42). The actor-network
theory examines the motivations and actions of human actors that align their interests around nonhuman actors. “Inscription” and “translation” are key concepts for understanding the interest
alignment to form an actor-network. The actors’ interests are flexible and can be translated, enabling
the interest alignment and the maintenance of an actor-network (Monteiro and Hanseth, 1996).
Politics exist in the process of interest alignment of competing agenda (Bowker and Star, 1999).
Further, Castells (2000) gives us the notion of counter-network that describes how different actors set
up contradictory networks (Braa et al, 2004). Our task is to disclose the process whereby actors
struggle to dominate the network building, and finally form a common actor-network through interest
translation by actors and the compromise of two counter-networks, which we hereby call defensive
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network and challenging network. Consequently we get our analytical framework as shown in Figure
1.

Defensive network

• Actor enrolment
• Actor interest alignment
• Counter-network compromise

Figure 1.
2.2

Challenging network

Framework of actor-network analysis
Method

The actor-network theory requires researchers to examine the process of interest alignment to form a
network (Monteiro and Hanseth, 1996). Accordingly, this paper presents a longitudinal case study
(Holmes and Poole, 1991). Using the terminology of actor-network theory as the unifying lexicon of
analysis, we first develop a process-oriented narrative of WAPI standardization in China. Through this
narrative we reveal how events, activities and choices are ordered over time. According to critical
events, the whole process is divided into three distinct phases. In the first phase, WAPI standards are
published. The second phase is characterized by the fierce debate between the Chinese standard
developers and international stakeholders in the WLAN market on the obligatory implementation of
WAPI technology. In the third phase, China decides to indefinitely postpone the WAPI
implementation. We then explain the WAPI standardization process by linking it with the
technological, institutional and social contexts.
The data were first collected from public sources, mainly the Internet. For the last two years China’s
initiative to implement WAPI has been the focus of Chinese and foreign media, researchers,
governments and information technology industry. We kept following the trend of WAPI
standardization, and browsed the reports that viewed China’s WAPI issue from different perspectives,
but specifically paid attention to official and authoritative data sources, like China Daily, People’s
Daily, etc. The second-hand data gave us outlines of the process whereby China developed and
implemented WAPI technology which, in turn, alerted us to the major technological, institutional and
social factors driving this process. To improve the reliability of these accounts, we used other data
sources to triangulate the evidence (Klein and Myers, 1999). We interviewed key players concerning
WAPI standardization. During the phase of collecting second-hand data, we kept regular email and
phone communications with these informants to seek answers to problems raised. Finally, towards the
end of 2004, when we had a rough picture of the whole process of WAPI standardization, we
undertook a field study in China to strengthen our understanding. We met people from the Ministry of
Information Industry (MII), China Communications Standard Association, Huawei as a Chinese
vendor with an international reputation, and China Telecom, a network operator.

3

THE CASE

There were two counter actor-networks fighting to dominate the interest inscription on WAPI
implementation. One could be called the defensive network, organized by MII to develop and protect
the WAPI standards; the other the challenging network, initiated by foreign WLAN manufacturers to
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confront implementing WAPI (Figure 1). The challenging network successfully enrolled the industrial
giants, associations, and the US government. In contrast, the defensive network continued to be weak.
As a result, WAPI failed to be implemented.
3.1

June 2001 to October 2003: standard development and publication

The incumbent Wi-Fi technology does not support good security mechanism to users and hence was
destined to be eliminated from the market. In China, on the one hand, more and more Chinese
individuals were ready to use wireless access to the Internet and the WLAN market was going to
boom. On the other hand, the security flaw of Wi-Fi restricted the interests of enterprises, government
branches, etc., in WLAN services. To protect more users being locked into this inferior technology
and promote the growth of the collective user market, MII was interested in quickly deploying new
WLAN standards with better security solutions. Consequently, in June 2001, MII published a R&D
plan of drafting national and industrial standards in wireless broadband fields, including two projects
about WLAN standards. Two months later, MII set up the China Broadband Wireless Internet Protocol
Standard Group (BWIPS) to undertake the R&D on WLAN standards1. BWIPS had 26 members: the
China Electronic Standard Institute (CESI) and the National Radio Monitoring Centre under MII, the
Research Center for Commercial Key of China affiliated to the Standard Administration of China
(SAC), five state universities, and companies with close relations with MII. MII also appointed two
liaison officials from its Division of Standardization to BWIPS.
In the beginning of 2002, SAC issued Decree Number 41, which included the two projects undertaken
by BWIPS in the issuing plan of national standards during 2002-2003. By the end of 2002, the first
versions of the standards were finished. These standards adopt a new security solution called WAPI.
Different from IEEE 802.11 technology, WAPI is a sort of elliptic-curve encryption with a block
cipher (Bo, 2003).
In January 2003, MII organized an evaluation of these two standards with 23 people from 12
organizations affiliated to MII and SAC, etc., voting. The expert comments were: WAPI standards
were based on advanced technologies; they were practical to combat the security flaws of current
WLAN solutions; they met the specific requirement of domestic market, and the implementation
method was feasible. Consequently, MII delivered an application to SAC for approving these two
technological solutions as national standards. On May 12th, 2003, SAC published these two standards
as national standards. The decree alleged that they were based on ISO/IEC9902.11 and
ISO/IEC8802.11b, and their design considered the interconnection of WLAN products.
On July 9th, 2003, a joint meeting was held to formally announce the publication of WAPI standards.
Officials from eight authorities, including MII, SAC, Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST),
State Reform and Development Commission (SRDC), etc., participated. In the press conference, they
introduced the technology advantage of the WAPI standards and outlined the market benefit they
might have for the Chinese information industry. They pledged that since WAPI implementation
concerned the national interests of security, they would continuously support it (Bo, 2003). This
meeting did not stress how to implement the WAPI technology, which turned out to be the top concern
of foreign actors in the WLAN market.
3.2

November 2003: announcing the schedule of implementation

On November 26th and December 1st, 2003, SAC issued Decree Number 110, which announced that
from June 1st, 2004, it was prohibited to produce, import and sell WLAN products that did not comply
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with WAPI standards. As a result, China refused to adopt Wi-Fi that needed technological
improvement for better information security (Pan and Fu, 2004).
The corresponding problem with WAPI was that it was a proprietary protocol controlled by the
Chinese government. According to the “Business Encryption Management Regulation” that was
published as Decree Number 273 by the State Council in October 1999, the WAPI algorithm was a
national secret and hence could only be authorized to specific Chinese companies. Eleven such
Chinese companies, including Huawei and Lenovo, were designated by the government to have the
algorithm. Foreign equipment vendors that wanted to sell WLAN products in China were required to
license WAPI through a manufacturing agreement with one of these Chinese companies (Chen, 2003).
To make matters worse, there was only a six-month grace period, until June 1st, to comply with the
mandatory standards. This touched off strong reaction from foreign stakeholders.
As Mannion and Clendenin (2003) described the situation: “Though China’s Wi-Fi standard has been
nearly two years in the making, the WAPI encryption algorithm seems to have caught the industry by
surprise.” Some manufacturers in Taiwan, including major players in international WLAN and the
semiconductor market like BenQ and D-Link, expressed their willingness to endorse the WAPI
standards and supply compatible equipment. In the US, wireless chip makers, Atheros, Cisco’s
Lindsys, and Netgear said they would build the specifications into products designed for the Chinese
market (Clendenin and Mannion, 2004; Zhu, 2004). Most companies like Hewlett-Packard and IBM
took the stance of “wait and see” (Fang and Fang, 2004).
These actors of defensive network were relatively weak players in the WLAN market. Their interests
resided in benefiting from the possible market re-shuffle due to implementing new standards. In
contrast, IEEE, Wi-Fi Alliance and its members like Broadcom and Intel dominated the WLAN
market. To protect their vested interests, these industry giants initiated the challenging network to
resist WAPI implementation. They first voiced their objection through the US Information
Technology Office (USITO). Located in Beijing, USITO was a trade group to protect the interests of
the US information industry in China. USITO concluded that whatever national-security argument
China might give, the way of implementing WAPI involved national protectionism. Specifically,
USITO warned the concerns that foreign products would be locked out of China’s WLAN market if
they could not reach an agreement with a local partner. Since the Chinese firms, many of which
competed with foreign vendors, were not under any obligation to license WAPI to their foreign
counterparts, this was possible or they charged too high a fee for authentication (Zhu, 2003).
IEEE was interested in maintaining its control on WLAN standards, for which it was working on the
802.11i version, aiming to provide higher level security and to substitute Wi-Fi. On November 23rd,
2003, Paul Nikolich, Chairman of the IEEE 802 Local and Metropolitan Area Network Standards
Committee, wrote a letter to the SAC Chairman and MII Minister. He wrote: “We are concerned that
mandatory use of the standard would prohibit the use of 802.11 standard products and thereby limit
choice and increase costs of users.” He argued that the Chinese security standard for wireless networks
could fracture Wi-Fi, the de facto WLAN standard, which meant its implementation could undermine
efforts to develop a global standard for WLAN and drive up the cost of network equipment for end
users. Nikolich acknowledged that 802.11 security should be improved, and offered to engage Chinese
authorities on this subject. He promised that IEEE was open to the possibility of incorporating WAPI
into 802.11i to avoid splitting the WLAN product markets into two 2.
The Chinese requirement to obligatorily implement WAPI was strongly against the interest of
Broadcom, the largest WLAN chip producer in the world. As early as on January 27th, 2004, its CEO
Alan Ross told Reuters (Sorid, 2004): “We are not playing their game. We are not going to lose our
technological edge through the risky disclosure of our intellectual property. To the extent that the only
way to enter the Chinese market is using their encryption scheme, we are not committed to doing that
2
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today”. Soon on January 30th, 2004, Wi-Fi Alliance declared sharing interests with Broadcom and
decided to reject WAPI. Its chairman, Dennis Eaton, criticized the WAPI standards as being only
favourable to Chinese firms, as the encryption method was controlled by BWIPS composed of
Chinese organizations. The WAPI implementation method forced foreign suppliers to produce their
chips in China, which led to the concern that their confidential techniques might be leaked to the
Chinese competitors. Dennis Eaton threatened that if compromise could not be reached, its members
would stop shipping WLAN equipment to China after June 1st (Liu, 2004).
In February 2004, more powerful actors were enrolled into the challenging network. The heads of
Information Technology Industry Council (ITI), Chamber of Commerce, Semiconductor Industry
Association (SIA), National Association of Manufactures (NAM), and US-China Business Council
(USCBC) met in Washington. These key US government and industry bodies made an effort to stifle
WAPI that was believed to undermine the WTO’s trading efforts with China (ITI, 2004; SIA, 2004).
This collective movement drew some congressmen to join in the challenging network. Representative
Philip Crane and Charles Rangel, Senator Max Baucus, Craig Thomas and Gordon Smith urged
government officials to be actively involved in this matter, and required the Chinese ambassador to the
US to deal with this issue. Some congressmen even sent a letter to President Bush and asked him to
take the WAPI case to WTO (USITO, 2004). As a result, the challenging network was substantially
intensified with the participation of three senior US officials. On March 3rd, Secretary of Commerce,
Donald Evens, Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and Trade Representative, Robert Zoelick wrote to
two Vice Premier Ministers of China, Wu Yi and Zeng Peiyan, who respectively were in charge of
international trade and high-tech policy. They pointed out that China’s move of implementing WAPI
created a precedent for using standards as barriers to international trade. This letter turned out to bring
significant diplomatic pressure on China to settle a compromise over the issue (Palmer, 2004).
WAPI was a big concern for Intel, the “Number one monopoly” in the Chinese WLAN market (Fang
and Fang, 2004). In spring 2002, Intel invested hundreds of millions of dollars to launch Centrino
processors based on the Wi-Fi standard. Laptops with Centrino processors were becoming the most
popular application for WLAN and profit was rolling in. But Intel’s interest in China’s WLAN market
was substantial, far beyond the profits arising from Centrino. Hence Intel was cautious to say “No” to
WAPI. It was on March 9th, 2004, when a strong challenging network had been established with the
involvement of the US government, that the spokeswoman of Intel’s Beijing Branch announced “Intel
is not able to reach an agreement with the Chinese companies authorized by the Chinese government
nor is it possible to find out a practical way to guarantee the quality in the execution of cooperation.”
Intel criticized that China developed this technology internally and refused to openly shared details
with others. But Intel would not rule out eventually using WAPI, provided that China was open to
making technical changes (Liu, 2004). Intel claimed that it made this decision after three months of
studying the WAPI implementation rules and having active talks with the Chinese government,
relevant institutions and firms on issues like techniques. While direct data were unavailable, it was
believed that Intel decided to reject WAPI because the Chinese side had asked for a royalty that was
too high for Intel to accept (Fordahal, 2004).
The Chinese government kept silent. The defensive network seemed to have only BWIPS as the active
actors. BWIPS’s spokesman alleged that it was a national sovereignty for a country to set up its own
standard in its own market for the concern of security. BWIPS claimed that even without foreign
cooperation, Chinese firms were able to manufacture their own WAPI compatible products (Zhu,
2003). Some Chinese computer makers had submitted applications to China Qualification Center
(CQC) to process certifications for their WAPI products (Liu, 2004). Founder, the 2nd largest computer
maker in China, reported the first success in developing A760 WAPI chips and access points. On April
5th, 2004, CQC issued the certificate to Founder’s NB700 laptop that had an embedded A760 chip.
But, by referring to an internal message, eNet reported that Founder’s access points were too
expensive for normal customers to use (Anonymous, 2004).
3.3

April 2004: postponing the implementation
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The 15th plenary session of the US-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) took
place on April 21, 2004 in the US. Established in 1983, JCCT was a government-to-government
consultative mechanism that provided a forum to resolve trade concerns and promote bilateral
commercial opportunities. This was a special session co-chaired by Secretary of Commerce, Donald
Evans, and Trade Representative, Robert Zoellick, on the US side and by Vice Premier Minister, Wu
Yi, on the Chinese side. WAPI was one of the seven issues of this meeting. The JCCT achieved
concrete results on key concerns. The US promised to ease restrictions on the export of some hightech US products to China, and would support China’s aspiration to seek “market economy status” in
the WTO. In return, China would suspend indefinitely the proposed implementation of WAPI as
mandatory standards, and revise WAPI standards to take into account comments from foreign firms
and participate in international standardization bodies3. As a result, the Chinese government led the
defensive network to concede to the challenging network. This move was necessary for the two
governments to maintain a network in issues with substantial interests on both sides.

4.

ANALYSIS: WHY DID CHINA’S WAPI INITIATIVE FAIL?

The Chinese developers and potential foreign adopters of WAPI technology conflicted on two issues.
The first one concerned the co-existence of competitive standards. The Wi-Fi Alliance claimed IEEE
802.11 had become the de facto industry standard, and WAPI was a deviation from the mainstream.
The Chinese side criticized Wi-Fi for its serious security flaws which had hindered the WALN market
development, and thus called for new standards. The question of a unique standard or competitive
standards in the market is a traditional debate in standardization communities. Both have pros and
cons. A unique standard supports the scale of economy, but it might lead to a monopoly and lock-in
the customers to inferior technology. To have multiple standards, the users have to afford the cost of
interconnection and interoperability. Hence, Wi-Fi Alliance could not simply require China to give up
competitive standards. In fact, China could have stopped Wi-Fi with the excuse of its poor security
mechanism, as some European countries did (Liu, 2004). China could also have protected itself with
the security advantage of WAPI, which deserved sacrificing incompatibility.
The problem was that WAPI did not support efficient compatibility with Wi-Fi, but China took it as
obligatory standards and restricted using Wi-Fi technology. The WAPI implication method was
unacceptable to foreigners, which was the second area of dispute. The WAPI encryption code was
only granted to Chinese firms, and foreign companies were forced to cooperate with them to get into
China’s WLAN market. While BWIPS insisted that China had the right to adopt its own standard in its
own market in a way required by the relevant law, Intel et al. saw it as discrimination and a
contradiction to WTO law regarding national treatment. For China, the argument is that the WTO
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) stipulates that a country can take protective
measures in the consideration of national security, which might give it the excuse to develop its own
proprietary standards. Given that the US National Security Agency fiddled with the Data Encryption
Standard to create encryption backdoors, why could China not control the code (Wirbel, 2004)?
To the end, the WAPI dispute was an interest conflict. The counter-network compromise was a result
of political negotiation and the trials of power. Intel successfully mobilized other vendors, industrial
associations, congressmen, and the US government forming a strong challenging network, where
different actors firmly stood together to boycott deploying WAPI. But BWIPS failed to set up a strong
defensive network. Only BWIPS itself showed a solid interest in implementing WAPI by the schedule
stipulated by relevant decrees. Further, it was in the national interest of China to back off the original
plan of implementing WAPI in exchange for the support of the US in more important trade issues.

3

For details see “The U.S.-China JCCT: Outcomes on Major U.S. Trade Concerns” at
http://www.ita.doc.gov/media/FactSheet/pdfs/JCCT_outcomes_and_signing_descriptions_042104.pdf
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Intel adopted a pragmatic strategy in forming the challenging network. In the beginning when Intel
still considered the possibility of cooperation, it exercised its voice of objection through USITO. Intel
formally announced the rejection when the state officials participated in the challenging network,
which meant that the WAPI issue became the concern of a normal trade relationship between two
countries. The national interest of the US was involved in the WAPI issue; hence, the challenging
network would not easily compromise. In contrast, BWIPS gave ambiguous, contradictory
information on the compatibility and advantage of WAPI technology. Its only strategy was to protect
itself by relating WAPI standards with sovereignty and national secrets.

5.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

We have observed that the strength of the actors’ interests, their specific positions in the market, and
their political power determine the interest alignment and hence the standardization process. In the
WAPI case, BWIPS members were the actors with direct interest to see WAPI obligatorily
implemented since it meant intellectual property right (IPR) income to them. Under a centralized
system of decision, the state had the final word on WAPI implementation. The state had to evaluate
the impact of WAPI implementation on the international trade and economic development. It also
needed to consider the interests of the consumers and operators. Hence, the decision of the state was
for the national interests as a whole, instead of limiting them to the WAPI issue. The interests of
incumbent foreign monopoly tended to be against WAPI that might challenge their established
positions in the WLAN market. But they needed to be careful to say “No” to avoid losing the Chinese
market. They also knew innovation was necessary due to the technological flaws in the security
mechanisms of the existing standards. So the interests of the incumbents could be translated under
proper contexts. Different actors stood in each of the two counter-networks, which fought for
dominance on whether or not to implement WAPI.
In technology WAPI was immature. It did not support efficient compatibility to incumbent standards
and its implementation would involve relatively higher costs. Hence, foreign competitors formed a
challenging network to boycott the implementation of WAPI standards. However, China lacked a
coherent institutional set-up to support BWIPS translating the interests of foreign manufacturers.
Above all, the Chinese government would not enrol itself in the defensive network, and without such a
powerful actor, the defensive network compromised to the challenging network and WAPI failed to be
implemented.
Our research results have theoretical implications for academia. In the literature, scholars explain the
standardization process from multiple perspectives using technological diffusion, economic, social,
and political theories (Gerst et al, 2005). On the other hand, actor-network theory mainly serves as a
methodology of describing a process as network building. In this paper, we demonstrate that actornetwork is a proper tool for conducting standardization study (Hanseth and Monteiro, 1997). In using
actor-network theory, researchers should take interest translation and inscription of actors, and
compromise of counter-networks as key words (Braa et al, 2004).
Our case study has practical implications for standardization practitioners, especially those in
developing countries. For authorities responsible for standardization management, our analysis
suggests that the standardization processes accommodate a considerable heterogeneity of interests
(Suttmeier, 2005). For developing countries, foreign pacesetters set the architecture that they have to
follow (Morris and Ferguson, 1993). Further, developing countries have a weak R&D capability.
Cooperation between new technology developers in these countries and foreign owners of incumbent
standards is extremely important to realize compatibility between new and incumbent standards, and
ensure the advantage of new technology.
The Chinese experience of implementing indigenous technology tells developing countries that the
debate around implementing a standard is a matter of interests, and the balance point of interests is
decided by actors in the counter-networks through their trial of power in market, technology and trade.
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These countries should be aware of their weak bargaining positions, and know that techno-nationalism
only works conditionally and market size advantage has limited power. In the case of WAPI, market
could be a leverage to allure foreign manufacturers to adopt WAPI, but it had a limited role as WTO
set the rules of the game. Though these rules could be disputed, compared with the US, China as a
developing country was on the weak position in bargaining and more likely to compromise. We may
get more implications from the case of Linux. In China, due to the government mandate, the Linuxbased operating system and office applications developed by Chinese software companies eroded
Microsoft’s dominance in software procurement. This was possible as China did not commit to
WTO’s item of government procurement (Cao, 2004).
Developing countries should encourage forming cross-industry institutions and social networks, and
use them to coordinate the interests of different actors in developing and implementing indigenous
technologies. In developing countries, these institutions and networks are often poorly developed, and
are sometimes neglected by policy-makers and technology developers (Chen and Ning, 2002).
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